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ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE USE OF 
HISTORYt 
Charles P. Lord* 
William A. Shutkin** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Environmental harms have traditionally fallen most heavily on low-
income communities and communities of color. In this essay, we take 
up the stories of two communities fighting against this disturbing 
trend and for environmental justice. In each community, we argue, 
the legal system has perpetuated environmental injustice by misread-
ing or disregarding that community's history. These two stories reveal 
that a flawed or careless approach to history is often a root cause of 
environmental injustice. We suggest, therefore, that communities such 
as those discussed in this essay must vigorously prepare and proclaim 
their own histories, and must urge courts and other decisionmakers 
to examine history carefully and justly. 
In Boston, a diverse group of residents lives at the crossroads of 
the inner-city where the South Bay/Newmarket Square area forms 
the meeting point of Dorchester, Roxbury, South Boston, and the 
South End. The residents who live in the South Bay/Newmarket 
Square area take pride in their efforts over the last several years to 
begin to change the character of their neighborhood from a blighted 
industrial zone to a blossoming commercial and residential area.1 They 
t Copyright © 1994 Charles P. Lord and William A. Shutkin. 
* Visiting Scholar, Boston College Law School 1993--1995; Co-Director, Alternatives for Com-
munityand Environment, Inc.; B.A. 1987, Yale University; J.D. 1992, University of Virginia. 
** Visiting Scholar, Boston College Law School 1993--1995; Co-Director, Alternatives for 
Community and Environment, Inc.; B.A. 1987, Brown University; M.A. (History), J.D. 1991, 
University of Virginia; Ph.D. candidate (Jurisprudence and Social Policy), University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley. 
For their fruitful comments and insights, the authors thank Avi Soifer, Zyg Plater, Anthony 
Farley, Buck DeWolf, Nate Stearns, and the students in their environmental justice seminar. 
1 See Zachary R. Dowdy, Coalition Files Suit to Stop South Bay Asphalt Plant, BOSTON 
1 
2 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:1 
fought the city for new street lights, neighborhood cleanups, and 
regular police patrols.2 In 1988, the residents defeated a proposal to 
build a municipal waste treatment facility a few hundred yards from 
their homes. More recently, a new shopping mall employing upwards 
of a thousand people has opened nearby. In all, the residents have 
made significant progress toward realizing their vision of a better 
community-a cleaner place to live and a healthy economy.3 
The South BaylN ewmarket Square area is a mixed-use district, 
however, and in 1992 a developer proposed to build an asphalt plant 
there. A permit is required for that use. In granting the permit, the 
Boston Zoning Board of Appeal determined that "historically and 
currently, the South Bay/Newmarket Industrial Development Area 
has been home to a broad diversity of industrial and commercial uses 
.... Consequently, the proposed use is ... consistent with existing 
uses in the area, and not, therefore, detrimental to ... the nearby 
Roxbury, South Boston, and South End neighborhoods."4 Without 
much more, the Board evaded the rich history and present state of 
the area, summing it up in this simple paragraph. 
History also played a central role in a case involving the aboriginal 
rights of the Abenaki, a Native American tribe of northern New 
England. According to the Abenaki's own texts, "[a]rchaeologists have 
proven that Abenaki have been in the Lake ChamplainlMissisquoi 
homeland continuously since 9300 B.C."5 The Abenaki claim that their 
ancestors maintained temporary and permanent settlements on the 
banks of the Missisquoi River and Lake Champlain in what is now 
northwestern Vermont. Until 1750, the Abenaki people of the Missis-
quoi region were "virtually undisturbed in their use and possession 
of their homeland."6 
In 1765, an English trader named Robertson leased a plot of land 
from the Abenaki, who had reserved for themselves land for the 
nation's cornfields, and twelve farms on either side of the Missisquoi 
River. Between 1765 and 1800, the presence of European settlers 
increased, and, as a result, the Abenaki moved into unsettled areas of 
Missisquoi.7 "After 1800, the Abenakis lived in the swampland areas 
GLOBE, Sept. 24, 1993, at 23; Michael Jonas, Proposed Asphalt Plant Must Undergo Further 
Review, BOSTON GLOBE, March 27, 1994, City Weekly at 5. 
2 Interview with Bruce Rose, Roxbury resident, in Boston, Massachusetts (Sept. 21, 1993). 
3 [d. 
4 South Bay Group, No. BZC-16523, at 2-3, 6 (City of Boston Bd. App. July 27,1993). 
5 Sovereign Republic of the Abenaki Nation of Missisquoi, Presentation to Water Resources 
Board 1 (Oct. 1, 1992). 
6 [d. 
7 [d. 
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from Missisquoi Bay to Maquam."s As Abenaki legend holds, through-
out the next century and a half the Abenaki "dispersed to secluded 
areas on the margins of villages ... [and] continued to travel around 
the area, like their ancestors, camping to hunt, fish and gather at older 
sites including Maquam."9 
Though the Abenaki thus claim a presence in their homeland going 
back 11,000 years, in 1992 the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that the 
Abenaki no longer hold "aboriginal title" to their ancestral home-
land.1O The court determined that the European settlers "intended" 
to extinguish that titleY The court examined the history of Abenaki 
movement in the area, explaining that "Indian conduct" is relevant to 
determining intent. According to the court, the Abenaki's history 
reveals the effect of European dominion over the Abenakis.l2 The 
court concluded that "it appears that the Abenaki response was pre-
dominantly passive .... Tribal presence continued through to the 1790's, 
but the tribe no longer controlled the area."13 The court, therefore, 
concluded that the Abenaki no longer held title.14 
Having recognized the complexity of the historical record, the court 
chose to ignore it. As a result, it also failed to address the question of 
justice. Because the history of Native Americans and indigenous peo-
ples generally is largely one of domination and oppression,15 an inquiry 
which ignores that history also ignores factors which shape our per-
ception of justice. 
In this Essay, we look at these two recent cases involving tradition-
ally oppressed groups and their efforts to reclaim their environment. 
In each, we claim, history has been viewed in a manner that subtly 
abstracts discrete instances of oppression, thereby perpetuating in-
8Id. at 4. 
9Id. 
10 State v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210, 214 (Vt. 1992). For a complete discussion of this case see infm 
notes 65-78 and accompanying text. 
11 Id. at 219 n.9. 
12 Id. at 219-20. 
13Id. 
14Id. 
15 On Native Americans and oppression, see generally MICHAEL DORRIS, PAPER TRAIL 
(1994); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE 
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The 
Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of 
Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237 (1990). On indigenous peoples generally, see Hurst 
Hannum, New Developments in Indigenous Rights, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 649, 667 (1988) ("[the] 
history of indigenous peoples is ... the chronicle of their unsuccessful attempts to defend their 
land against invaders"); William A. Shutkin, Note, International Human Rights Law and the 
Earth: The Protection of Indigenous Peoples and the Environment, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 479, 
484--85 (1991). See generally Richard Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous 
Peoples), in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES (James Crawford ed., 1988). 
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justice and allowing decisionmakers to hide behind what the political 
historian Walter Karp called history's "vast, all-concealing cloak."16 In 
Byda v. Board of Appeal of Boston,17 the Boston Zoning Board of 
Appeal relied casually on history in determining that the construction 
of an asphalt plant in an inner-city community historically overbur-
dened with heavy industrial uses was "appropriate."18 Yet, the Board 
never really confronted the history of the area nor did it recognize 
that it was obliged to examine that history scrupulously. Rather, it 
complacently looked to the area as it existed for a fixed period of time 
so as to make its inquiry facile and unproblematic. 
In State ofVerrrwnt v. Elliott, the Vermont Supreme Court acknow-
ledged that the Abenaki never affirmatively surrendered their rights 
in the land.19 And yet the court based its denial of this Native Ameri-
can tribe's right to fish on ancestral lands without a license on nothing 
more than the "increasing weight of history."2o Although the court 
seemed to recognize that it had a responsibility to examine the his-
torical record, it nonetheless failed to engage that record's complexity 
and particularity, and ignored entirely the question of justice under-
lying the past events and practices at issue. 
In each case, we suggest, history has been examined wholly uncriti-
cally so as to be treated as an unproblematic, objective guide for 
decisionmaking. Consequently, the Board in Byda and the Elliott 
court not only allowed past oppressive practices to continue unabated, 
but revealed by their uncritical stance that we as a legal community 
are powerless to change historical inequities. We have found that an 
awareness of the uses of history is critical to a community's fight for 
environmental justice. In order to avoid the hidden traps presented 
by simplistic histories, a community must be prepared both to dem-
onstrate the limits or inadequacies of history as conceived by courts 
and other public institutions, and to articulate a more complete his-
tory that incorporates not only a view of the past, present and future, 
but also the question of justice. 
Thus, in an effort both to transform impassive judges and others 
into public actors willing to engage the complexity of history and the 
knotty issue of justice, and to ameliorate the conditions of oppression 
the law often abides, we recommend that courts, zoning boards, and 
16Walter Karp, In Defense of Politics: Against Theorists, Cynics, and the New Historians, 
HARPER'S MAG., May 1988, at 43. 
17 No. 93 Civ. 5479 (Suffolk County Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 1993). 
18 See infra notes 22-64 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 65-97 and accompanying text. 
20 State v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210, 218 (Vt. 1992). 
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other decisionmakers adopt a pragmatic approach to history as well 
as one that addresses the question of justice.21 That is, we urge gov-
ernment decisionmakers to realize the density and contingency of 
history and to integrate the issue of justice in their historical analyses. 
In so doing, we suggest that the idea of history as it applies to law 
ought to be enriched, to be viewed as embodying past injustices and 
the current aspirations of communities. Consequently, we argue, the 
use of history might help move us closer to a better democracy.22 
II. BYDA V. BOARD OF APPEAL OF BOSTON: HISTORY AND 
COMPLACENCY 
To approach history casually and complacently, is to evade history's 
inevitably multiplicitous facts and to mask the many meanings the 
facts could support.23 As Byda demonstrates, when history is viewed 
complacently it becomes simplistic and monolithic. As such, it oper-
ates as a trap to prevent communities long overburdened by uses no 
other area would tolerate from escaping that particular part of their 
past, and from realizing their visions for a better future. 
A. The Case 
On September 22, 1993, several residents of Roxbury and the South 
End, communities that in part comprise the City of Boston, filed a 
lawsuit against the Boston Zoning Board of Appea1.24 The suit alleged 
that the Board exceeded its authority in granting a conditional use 
permit on September 8, 1993 to AP South Bay Corporation to con-
struct an asphalt manufacturing facility at a site in the South Bay/New-
market Square area of Roxbury located near the residents.25 Though 
zoned for general industrial use, the zoning district abuts residential 
areas. 
The residents who filed the suit are part of a larger group, the 
Coalition Against the Asphalt Plant. The Coalition represents over 
sixty neighborhood organizations from Dorchester, Roxbury, South 
21 See infra notes 98--117 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
23 See James T. Kloppenberg, The Theary and Practice of American Legal History, 106 HARV. 
L. REV. 1332, 1334 (1993) (reviewing MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992) (discussing the critique by decon-
structionist historians of the presentation of history as truth, or as an inevitability». 
24 Byda v. Board of Appeal of Boston, No. 93 Civ. 5479 (Suffolk County Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 
1993). 
25 ld. 
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Boston and the South End. These communities have significant Afri-
can-American and Hispanic-American populations, among others. As 
well, they are largely low-income communities. Like most inner-city 
areas, Dorchester, Roxbury, South Boston and the South End tradi-
tionally have borne the brunt of heavy industrial uses and other 
locally undesirable land uses. From lead paint to particulate emissions 
to midnight dumping, these communities clearly have suffered dispro-
portionately from environmental harms, yet have few resources to 
deal with these harms.26 
Specifically, the plaintiffs in Byda claimed that the facility would 
not merely serve to further devalue their property and create more 
traffic and noise in their neighborhood, but also would seriously en-
danger their health. A 1988 decision by the Massachusetts Depart-
ment of Environmental QUality Engineering,27 for instance, found that 
residents of the South Bay area of Boston suffered from elevated 
health risks.28 These included elevated cancer incidence and elevated 
mortality rates for cerebrovascular and ischemic heart disease, ele-
vated infant mortality rates, elevated rates of pulmonary disorders, 
and elevated incidence of childhood lead poisoning.29 Thus, particulate 
and gaseous air emissions from the operation of the facility might well 
cause harm to the plaintiffs, even though the emissions would be at 
levels below state and federal regulatory thresholds. 
Moreover, the plaintiffs relied on a recent study by researchers at 
the Harvard School of Public Health demonstrating an association 
between fine particulate air emissions and mortality rates in inner-
city areas.30 The study, known as the Six Cities Study, makes clear 
26 See Byda, No. 93 Civ. 5479, at 2-10; Jonas, supra note 3, at 5. This is the typical scenario of 
environmental justice cases. See generally CONFRONTING ENvmONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES 
FROM THE GRASSROOTS (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1992); 'lbXIC STRUGGLES: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (Richard Hofrichter ed., 1993); Vicki Been, Whats 
Fairness Got 7b Do With It? Enviranmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable 
Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993); Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to 
Environmental Protectian: The Need for Enviranmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 
(1992). 
27 The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality is now called the Department of 
Environmental Protection. 
28 Site Assignment of South Cove Resource Recovery Facility (Dep't of Envtl. Quality Eng'g 
June 7, 1988)(final decision) at 11-12. 
29Id.; see Letter from Lawrence A. Dwyer, Commissioner of Department of Health and 
Hospitals, City of Boston, to Secretary of Environmental Affairs Trudy Coxe, Feb. 28, 1994 
(outlining the excess in hospital admissions of up to 100% for asthma and other respiratory 
ailments in Roxbury, South Boston and the South End as compared to the rest of the Common-
wealth) (on file with the authors). 
30 Douglas W. Dockery et al., An Associatian Between Air Pollutian and Mortality in Six 
U.S. Cities, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753 (1993). 
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that particulate air emissions at levels below those commonly held to 
be acceptable are hazardous to the health of inner-city residents.31 
Because the facility would produce significant amounts of particulate 
matter, the plaintiffs, already burdened with elevated health risks, 
were especially concerned about the proposed asphalt plant.32 
In 1991, AP South Bay Corporation, then called Todesca Equipment 
Company, Inc., had applied for a conditional use permit to construct 
their asphalt plant in a middle-class neighborhood in Jamaica Plain, 
another Boston community.33 Like the site in Roxbury, the Jamaica 
Plain site was zoned for general industrial and manufacturing use 
under the Boston Zoning Enabling Act.34 The permit was denied, 
however, because the Inspectional Services Department determined, 
in part, that the asphalt plant was not an appropriate use for the 
area.35 
B. The Court and History 
Section 6-3 of the Zoning Enabling Act provides the conditions that 
must be met in order for a conditional use permit to be granted. The 
first condition states, in pertinent part, that "the specific site is an 
appropriate location for such use .... "36 Though the language of the 
appropriateness condition is plainly ambiguous, its intent, like section 
6--3 generally, is to ensure that the use in issue is consistent with past 
and existing uses so as not to disturb expectations regarding the 
character of the neighborhood, or otherwise adversely affect the neigh-
borhood.37 The appropriateness standard, therefore, necessarily re-
quires the Zoning Board to consider the history of the neighborhood 
surrounding the site. That is, the appropriateness of the proposed use 
is contingent, a fortiori, upon the uses allowed in the past. 
The Board, upon considering the history of the South BaylNewmar-
ket area, concluded that: 
Unlike other neighborhoods ... South Bay/Newmarket's growth 
has principally depended upon industrial and commercial activity 
for most of the 20th Century. 
31 [d. 
32 See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Amend the Track Designation at 1-3, 
Byda v. Bd. of Appeal of Boston, No. 93 Civ. 5479 (Suffolk County Super. Ct., Nov. 12, 1993). 
33 Application for Conditional Use Permit, No. 3685 (Inspectional Servs. Dep't June 24,1992). 
34 Acts of 1965, c. 665, Art. 3, § 3--1. 
35 Decision of the Inspectional Servs. Dep't, No. 3685 (City of Boston June 24, 1992). 
36 Acts of 1965, c. 665, Art. 3, § 6-3(a). 
37 See id. 
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Historically and currently, the South Bay/N ewmarket Indus-
trial Development Area has been home to a broad diversity of 
industrial and commercial uses .... Consequently, the proposed 
use is pursuant to zoning, consistent with existing uses in the 
area, and not, therefore, detrimental to ... the nearby Roxbury, 
South Boston, and South End neighborhoods.38 
Once the Board determined that the South Bay/Newmarket area 
was traditionally home to industrial and commercial uses, its conclu-
sions concerning the appropriateness of the facility for the area seem 
inexorable. To be sure, the Board's approach to history suggests the 
logic underlying its conception of "appropriateness." That is, the Board's 
historical "method," apparent in its brief findings, was uncritical and 
complacent. There essentially was no method. The Board did not 
inquire into the details or merits of past zoning decisions or the rich, 
protean history of the area, nor did it bother to compare existing uses 
to those of the past.39 It simply accepted as a matter of course that 
because industrial uses were historically sanctioned in this area, they 
should continue to be.40 This uncritical stance blinded the Board not 
only to the particularistic history of the South Bay/Newmarket area, 
but also to its present conditions, and led to a finding that the facility 
was appropriate. 
c. History and Complacency 
The Board's blindness suggests that the first step in addressing the 
role of history in environmental justice cases should be to challenge 
the complacent approach to history. In Byda, this complacency is 
revealed in the Board's casual treatment of history as somehow mono-
lithic or involuntary. Some scholars have explored the dangers and 
pitfalls of portraying history this way. Their analysis helps demon-
38 South Bay Group, No. BZC-16523, at 2--,'3, 6 (City of Boston Bd. App. July 27,1993). The 
Board "supported" this argument by reference to the surrounding land uses, noting that: 
[DJirectly abutting the Premises on the Southampton Street side is Waldo Bros., a 
brick and cement construction supply business. On the Moore Street side, at a site 
most recently occupied by Truck Center, Inc., a truck sales and service business, is the 
locus of the proposed Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority ... police vehicle 
operations, maintenance, and storage facility. New England Mail, Inc., and a vacant, 
bank-owned property abut the Premises on Cummings Street; and the long-dormant 
incinerator facility borders the Premises on South Bay Avenue. The area also includes 
meat and fish processing facilities; bakery operations; a Suffolk County correctional 
facility; and a shopping mall under construction .... In the recent past, the Premises 
were operated as an automotive junk yard .... 
[d. at 2-3. 
39 [d. 
40 [d. 
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strate that the Board's complacent historical method is both insidious 
and indefensible. 
Certainly, the use of history to justify or disparage present-day 
decisions and practices-and thereby to attempt to shape future events-
is commonplace in both public and private discourse. The rhetorical 
power of history alone-its instant evocation of great eras and dra-
matic episodes, its inextricable link to romantic nationalism-makes 
history a powerful device in the hands of poets and politicians alike. 
Furthermore, history itself has often been viewed as something more 
than human, a '''full presence beyond the reach of play."'41 Historians, 
too, sometimes have seen themselves as "'heroic, ... unprejudiced, 
dispassionate, all-seeing."'42 Walter Karp, bemoaning the tendency to 
view history as greater than the sum of its human parts, echoed 
Tocqueville when he wrote of "the 'dangerous tendency' of [this kind 
of] history: 'Men are led to believe that this movement [ of society] is 
involuntary, and that societies unconsciously obey some superior force 
ruling over them."'43 
Yet, as Karp believed, the notion that history is somehow objective 
so as to be seen as controlling human events has grave consequences 
for the American republic.44 He feared that such a notion is a "murk" 
that has "thickened into darkness and settled over power ... like a 
vast, all-concealing cloak."45 Karp continued, "the [twentieth] century 
is terrifying in its revelation of the power of deeds and the lust for 
dominion, and yet, astonishingly, it makes no dent in the new his-
tory."46 In Karp's view, a synoptic approach-a God's-eye view-to 
history allows discrete deeds of oppression to go unchallenged by 
masking them with the veil of largeness and of objectivity.47 The 
41 Richard Rorty, Trotsky and the Wild Orchids, in WILD ORCHIDS AND TROTSKY: MESSAGES 
FROM AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES 29,50 (Mark Edmundson ed. 1993) (quoting J. Derrida). G.W.F. 
Hegel, for instance, argued that history does not consist of meaningless chance but a rational, 
dialectical process, the essence of which is "none other than the progress of the consciousness 
of Freedom." See GEORGE W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 1-19 (J. Sibree trans. 
1956). To Hegel, history alone entails the self-realization and complete development of spirit 
that constitute true freedom. [d. 
42 David A. Hollinger, Truth by Consensus, NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW, March 27, 1994, 
at 16 (quoting JOYCE ApPLEBY ET AL., TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY (1994». 
43 Karp, supra note 16, at 43 (quoting Tocqueville). Karp decried that "[t]o the writers of this 
new history, action no longer accounts for historic change. By a strange revolution of thought, 
social change is said to account for action. Society or economics or even 'history' itself orders 
and causes our conduct, reducing it to mere motion, habit, and rote .... " [d. 
44 [d. at 43. 
45 [d. at 43-44. 
4ll [d. 
47 Federal Appeals Court Judge John Noonan, among others, makes a similar argument with 
10 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:1 
insidious effect of this approach on historians and others whose job it 
is to account for human events is to leave them powerless-"[l]ike a 
patient etherized upon a table."48 Karp thus argues that a complacent 
historical method is dangerous, for it undermines our ability to re-
define ourselves as a nation and to change the course of human events. 
Legal discourse frequently employs history in one form or another 
and occasionally treats it as transcendent, bringing truth and legiti-
macy to legal decisions. Stare decisis, for example, holds that past 
decisions, simply by virtue of their historicity, their pastness, shall be 
binding. In this way, history, at least as revealed through particular 
decisions, controls contemporary cases. Moreover, Erwin Chemerin-
sky explains that the conception of history as both omnipotent and 
monolithic governs American jurisprudence.49 The United States Su-
preme Court currently views history as virtually the sole source of 
legitimacy for the Court's decisions.50 The ideas of originalism and 
neutral principles having run their course, Chemerinsky suggests that 
the Court now considers history the only neutral, objective standard by 
which constitutional cases should be adjudged.51 Principles and prac-
tices embedded in America's social history thus serve to determine 
how the Court will rule. 
Chemerinsky's analysis of the Supreme Court's use of history in its 
jurisprudence speaks pointedly to the role of history in environmental 
justice cases. In Chemerinsky's view, the Court has begun to use 
history and tradition in almost every aspect of its jurisprudence.52 
According to Chemerinsky, the increasing use of history and tradition 
stems from the central fallacy that history is determinative and ob-
jective.53 Indeed, he suggests, "the focus on history is motivated, in 
part, by a desire for an objective basis for judicial decision-making to 
constrain the Justices and avoid results based on their personal pref-
erences."54 The Court's use of history suggests that in fact the oppo-
site is true; history is subjective and cannot be cast as monolithic. 
respect to law. Noonan describes the "mask" of the law as a device lawyers, judges, and 
politicians have used to render public decisions they might well find offensive or immoral in 
their private lives. See J.T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, 
HOLMES, JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS (1976). 
48T.S. ELIOT, The Lovesong of J. Alfred Pmfrock, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 
1909-19503,3(1971). 
49 Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Conrt, and the First Amendment, 44 
HASTINGS L.J. 901, 901 (1993). 
50Id. 
5! Id. at 903. 
52 See id. at 903-0S. 
53Id. at 912-13. 
54Id. at 915. 
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Justice Antonin Scalia's due process jurisprudence, for instance, 
begins with the premise that a "liberty interest must be rooted in 
history and tradition."55 In assessing whether a right can be protected 
under the Due Process Clause, Justice Scalia states that "[ w]e refer 
to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or 
denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified."56 In other 
words, Chemerinsky argues, "by Justice Scalia's view, a right can be 
protected under the Due Process Clause only if there is a specific 
tradition of recognizing the right."57 Accordingly, Chemerinsky notes 
that the search for a single national "tradition" is ultimately fruitless, 
for in a system based on federalism there are likely to be many 
different traditions that vary by geography.58 Further, he claims, tra-
ditions will vary over time. As well, and perhaps most critically, 
Chemerinsky suggests that the presentation of history as objective is 
undermined by the indeterminacy inherent in choosing the level of 
abstraction at which to describe the tradition.59 
Taken together, Karp and Chemerinsky thus set forth how a com-
munity ought to prepare its arguments regarding history. Environ-
mental justice advocates must attack complacency by raising the 
issue of historical method and debunking the widespread acceptance 
of history as monolithic. If the Board in Byda had been forced to look 
seriously at the history of the site, for instance, it would have discov-
ered that the area was once home to thriving immigrant communities 
in the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth.60 Moreover, the 
Board would have found that contemporaneous with the industrial 
development of the South BaylN ewmarket area, nearby communities 
were gradually deteriorating under the weight of the urban blight and 
neglect that characterizes much of the latter half of this century.61 
Moreover, with greater scrutiny, the Board would have seen that the 
same industrial uses that had grown out of a period of economic 
prosperity and urban development earlier in the century had now 
perished. Thus, for example, all that remains of heavy industry in the 
South BaylN ewmarket area is the corpse of an old municipal incin-
55 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989). See also Chemerinsky, supra note 48, at 
904--05. 
56 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6. 
57 Chemerinsky, supra note 49, at 905. 
58 See id. at 915. 
59 See id. at 917. 
60 OSCAR HANDLIN, BOSTON'S IMMIGRANTS: A STUDY IN ACCULTURATION 99 (1979). 
61 See ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 75-S0 (1993). See generally JANE JACOBS, THE LIFE AND DEATH 
OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961). 
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erator. The Board simply could not have discerned, given its uncritical 
approach, that the existing uses in the area are no longer industrial 
in the way the asphalt facility clearly is. From the construction supply 
business to the bakery to the correctional facility and the new mall, 
the area is decidedly non-industria1.62 
To be sure, in the middle 1980s the communities surrounding the 
site had pledged to move the area in a new direction, away from past 
industrial uses insensitive to the quality of life of the area and toward 
only those industries and businesses that both create new job oppor-
tunities and operate without noxious emissions. This pledge is embod-
ied in the regulations of the Newmarket Industrial Development 
Area.63 Employing only six full-time staff and generating a host of 
gaseous and particulate emissions, in addition to significant traffic and 
noise, the proposed asphalt plant plainly violates the terms and spirit 
of the regulations. 
The role of history in the Board's decision, therefore, is deeply 
problematic. In the Board's view, history is a monolithic, static object 
to be accepted uncritically. History as interpreted by the Board served 
to provide the justification for perpetuating past uses regardless of 
the accuracy of that history, the changing character of the area, and 
the new vision the neighborhood had developed in an effort to lighten 
or eliminate the damaging effects of past zoning decisions. The Board's 
view of history as object simply could not accommodate the particu-
laristic, dynamic quality of either the past, present, or future. 
Consequently, the Board in Byda rendered an impoverished ver-
sion of the history of the South Bay/Newmarket area and a thin 
conception of appropriateness. History thus stands as an impermeable 
bulwark for the status quo. Notwithstanding the decidedly richer 
history of the area omitted from the Board's analysis, as well as the 
unequivocal commitment on the part of the community to move to-
ward a better future, history in Byda operated to justify and perpetu-
ate both past and present burdens disproportionately allocated. His-
tory as object, thus, can function like a giant trap even in the most 
routine instances.64 
62 See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Byda v. Bd. of 
Appeal of Boston, No. 93 Civ. 5479 (Suffolk County Super. Ct., Sept. 22, 1993). 
63 See Econ. Dev. & Indus. Corp. Regulations Applicable In Industrial Development Areas, 
§§ 50-30, 50-31 (1988). 
64 History here functions like the inescapable "iron cage" of bureaucratic rationality Max 
Weber described in criticizing the Enlightenment project. See HABERMAS AND MODERNITY 5 
(Richard Bernstein ed., 1985). 
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Encouraging a court to embrace a critical historical method may 
not in itself, however, eliminate the use of history as a tool to perpetu-
ate injustice. A court that rejects the complacent approach to history 
and the view of history as monolithic will not necessarily engage the 
complexity of history or address the issue of oppression. In pursuing 
environmental justice, it may not be enough that a court purportedly 
has an effective historical method. 
III. STATE OF VERMONT V. ELLIOTT: THE WEIGHT OF HISTORy65 
The Vermont Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Elliotfj36 
presents a contrast between two approaches to history and calls to 
battle environmental justice advocates. The case is but one example 
of how a flawed, though seemingly sophisticated, historical method 
may be as bad as no method at all. Notwithstanding a court's embrace 
of a particular approach to history, as long as that approach is not 
itself rigorous or critical, a court may still arbitrarily select one com-
munity's story over another. Such an arbitrary selection might en-
hance the likelihood that the stories of the marginal or disenfran-
chised will be muted or ignored. 
Unlike Byda, the Elliott case involves a decision-making body that 
at least recognized that it was obliged to undertake a serious exami-
nation of the past. However, the court in Elliott essentially shirked 
its responsibility, avoiding the interpretive problems posed by the 
historical record and leaving unanswered the question of justice. In 
Elliott, the Vermont Supreme Court's approach to history masked the 
flaws in its historical method that allowed it to find the answers to 
historical questions in the unequal social conditions of the present. 
A. The Case 
In October, 1987, thirty-six members of the Abenaki Nation staged 
a "fish-in" demonstration on land they claimed as their ancestral 
home. The State of Vermont charged the thirty-six with fishing with-
out a license. In defense of its members, the tribe, a subpopulation of 
65 Professor Aviam Soifer has written about the Vermont Supreme Court's decision in State 
v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210 (Vt. 1992), with particular emphasis on the court's notion of the weight 
of history and its use in rejecting Abenaki claims. Aviam Soifer, Objects in the Mirrar Are Closer 
Than They Appear, 28 GA. L. REV. 533 (1994). 
66 616 A.2d 210. 
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the Western Abenaki, claimed that it was not subject to state regu-
lation because it held aboriginal rights to the land.67 
The doctrine of aboriginal rights describes the ownership interest 
retained by Native Americans in lands that have been appropriated 
by European nations. The right arises from a tribe's occupation of an 
ascertainable ancestral homeland before European colonization and 
does not depend on treaty, statute or other formal declaration. In 
essence, the doctrine created a dual right to the land-the discovering 
European nation, the first in time, held title to the land subject to the 
Native American tribe's continued right of occupancy and use.68 Abo-
riginal rights may be established if a currently viable Native Ameri-
can tribe has occupied land since before European arrival on the 
continent.69 
Under the historical method established by those few courts that 
have addressed the issue of extinguishment, a sovereign may only 
extinguish aboriginal rights by an affirmative act.70 Extinguishment 
must occur by act or consent of the European sovereign,71 or may 
occur "by treaty, by the sword, by purchase, or by exercise of com-
plete dominion adverse to the right of occupancy."72 As the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated in United States v. Gemmill, the 
central "question is whether the governmental action was intended 
to be a revocation of Indian occupancy rights .... "73 
The Elliott case thus turned on the question of whether the sover-
eign intended to extinguish the Abenaki's rights. The trial court sought 
to answer this question by examining a series of events between 1763 
and Vermont's admission into the Union in 1791.74 In 1763, British 
Royal Governor Wentworth issued a land grant in an area that was 
then New Hampshire to a group later known as the Vermonters. By 
the conditions of the grant, the land would revert to the Crown after 
a certain time unless settled and cultivated. Specifically, the Crown 
required grantees to settle or cultivate five out of each fifty acres 
granted. Contemporaneous with the grants, a series of Royal Instruc-
67Id. at 211-12. 
68 Id. (quoting FELIX S. COHEN & RENNARD STRICKLAND, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW 486-87 (1982». 
69Id. at 212. 
70 See id. at 213. 
71 FELIX S. COHEN & RENNARD STRICKLAND, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 487 
(1982). 
72 United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941). 
73 535 F.2d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 1976). 
74 Elliott, 616 A.2d at 215. 
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tions forbade settlers from settling in land occupied by N ati ve Ameri-
cans.75 
A conflict between New York and New Hampshire over these lands 
ensued. Ignoring the original grants from Wentworth, the Governor 
of New York granted land to his subjects in the area of the Wentworth 
grants. In 1764, a British Privy Council order placed the lands in New 
York, but a 1767 order halted all settlement in the area. In 1769, New 
York began ejectment suits, but in the six years that followed, Ver-
monters took events into their own hands. The original grantees 
rallied around Ethan Allen and the Green Mountain Boys to keep out 
the New Yorkers and any other challengers.76 In 1777, Vermont de-
clared itself an independent republic. Four years later, the Republic 
negotiated with Congress the terms of its admission into the Union. 
While the Vermonters declared that the terms of the grants had yet 
to be fulfilled, they also declared that the grants had not been forfeited 
and that the cultivation and settlement requirements would be met. 
Having examined this history, the trial court held that the Missis-
quoi Tribe held unextinguished aboriginal rights to the land at issue.77 
The trial court therefore dismissed the charges against the tribal 
members for fishing without a license.78 
B. The Vermont Supreme Court's Historical Method 
The Vermont Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court.79 Re-
fusing to answer whether the Abenaki are a viable tribe, the court 
nonetheless found that the Abenaki's aboriginal rights had been ex-
tinguished.80 As Aviam Soifer has noted, the supreme court deter-
mined that the Abenaki's aboriginal rights had been extinguished by 
the "increasing weight of history," as measured by the "cumulative 
effect of many historical events."8! This methodology marked a telling 
shift away from the trial court's approach and was fatal to the Abenaki's 
claim. The court's methodology highlights both the potential pitfalls 
inherent in the use of history by courts and the oppressiveness of 
history in this particular case. 
75 [d. 
76 [d. at 216. 
77 [d. 
78 See id. at 212. 
79 [d. 
80 [d. at 214. 
81 Soifer, supra note 65, at 543. 
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The supreme court in Elliott refused to limit the test for extinguish-
ment to an examination of "discrete events."82 Instead, the court 
examined "the cumulative effect of many historical events."83 The 
court's approach was to examine whether the Abenaki's rights were 
extinguished by the "weight" of historical events, rather than a par-
ticular event or series of events. The court abandoned narrative as a 
way of describing historical events and replaced it with a scale on 
which to measure the persuasiveness or truth of conflicting stories. 
As a result, the court did not examine events in sequence and was not 
constrained by the need to tell a story, to explain conflicting events, 
or to resolve inherent contradictions. In short, the Vermont Supreme 
Court created a balancing test that compared the competing versions 
of the past.84 
The net result of this transformation was to shift the burden of 
proof from the government to the Abenaki. While under a narrative 
method competing evidence would preclude getting at the truth of 
conflicting stories, under a balancing test the court could still weigh 
these stories in favor of the government. That is, instead of the 
government alone having to point to an affirmative act of extinguish-
ment, the Abenaki also had to demonstrate convincingly that no such 
act occurred. For example, the court saw the interplay between the 
Royal Instructions and the Wentworth grants not as contradictory 
evidence on the issue of the sovereign's intent, but rather, when 
weighed against each other, as evidence of an interest in pacifying the 
region and not protecting Indians.85 The court sidestepped the ambi-
guity of Wentworth's authority by declaring it irrelevant. The court 
stated that though Wentworth's grants may not have been authorized 
by the Crown, that did not detract from the vast political changes 
they engendered.86 
Similarly, the court refused to assess whether or not the Abenaki 
actually abandoned their land. The court discerned in the 1777 Con-
stitution of the Vermonter's Union an intent to dominate the land, 
which the court balanced against the Abenaki's intent to remain in 
the region. The court reasoned that the ambiguity surrounding the 
Abenaki's conduct during the period demonstrated an intent to leave 
their land.87 
82 Elliott, 616 A.2d at 218. 
83 Id. 
84 See id. 
85 Id. at 218-19. 
86 Id. at 219. 
87 Id. at 219 n.9. That the Abenaki remain in northwestern Vermont, as they do throughout 
1994] ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 17 
By creating a balancing test, the Vermont Supreme Court managed 
to use ambiguity against the Abenaki. As a result, the court was able 
to approach the historical record freely and carelessly, while claiming 
that its interpretation of history was objective. By avoiding or ignor-
ing the facts' contrary message, and by casting history in abstract 
terms,88 the supreme court's balancing test transformed history into 
an effective tool for protecting the status quo. For instance, the court's 
reading of the "intent" of the various parties was inevitably colored 
by the social context as it existed at the time the case was heard. 
Thus, in the eyes of the court, that the Abenaki lived and continue to 
live on the margins of Vermont society proved their failure to vindi-
cate their rights in the past.89 
C. The Trial Court's Historical Method 
The trial court in Elliott utilized an historical method that con-
trasted sharply with the one employed by the supreme court. The 
trial court's method embodies some aspects of the historical method 
that a community ought to encourage courts to use. The trial court's 
method and findings illustrate the payoff from rigorous historical 
analysis for traditionally oppressed communities. 
As discussed above, the courts have looked to history to determine 
the intent of the sovereign-the United States or a state-based on 
evidence of a central act of extinguishment.9o In pre-Elliott cases, 
where the courts found the central event indeterminate, they allowed 
that extinguishment be clarified by subsequent historical events.91 
Thus, under the traditional methodology, unless the government can 
establish its intent through an unambiguous act, or clarify its intent 
through subsequent events, the tribe presumably retains aboriginal 
title. 
Under this method, courts examine the events to determine whether 
they tell a single story.92 Though it court may clarify a sovereign's 
central act by reference to events that occurred months, years or even 
decades later, it must examine the historical evidence to determine 
whether it can be organized into a coherent narrative. Where the 
much of northern New England, attests to the enduring intent of the tribe to stay put. Clearly, 
history itself belies the court's claim. 
88 Soifer, supra note 65, at 535--,'36. 
89 See Elliott, 616 A.2d at 219 n.9. 
90 See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. 
91 See United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Pueblo 
of San Idelfonso, 513 F.2d 1383, 1388-90, 1391-92 (Ct. Cl. 1975). 
92 Kloppenberg, supra note 23, at 1333--,'34. 
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court cannot, the government fails to prove that aboriginal rights 
were extinguished. Thus the burden of overcoming history's ambigu-
ity falls on the government.93 
The trial court in the Elliott case performed an "exhaustive" analy-
sis of "extensive and meticulous" findings in order to assess whether 
the Abenaki's rights "were extinguished by either an express act or 
an act clearly and unambiguously any sovereign's intent to extinguish 
those rights."94 The trial court decided, in essence, that the govern-
ment had failed to show that a "single event constituted express or 
implied termination of aboriginal rights."95 The trial court held that 
Wentworth did not have the authority to grant Native American 
lands, in light of the Royal Instructions prohibiting settlement on 
such lands.96 As the original grants to settlers did not come from the 
sovereign, the trial court argued that there had been no extinguish-
ment of aboriginal rights.97 The government had failed to meet its 
burden of showing unequivocally, with reference to discrete events, 
that the Abenaki's rights had been extinguished. In other words, the 
conflict between the historical events, and the resulting ambiguity of 
the record regarding the issue of extinguishment, undermined the 
court's ability to tell the "true" story of extinguishment. Accordingly, 
the trial court ruled in favor of the Abenaki. 
Approaching the historical record scrupulously and painstakingly, 
the trial court created a narrative, analyzing the historical events in 
sequence. Conflicting and indeterminate events precluded the possi-
bility of constructing a "true" tale. The Abenaki thus triumphed as a 
result of ambiguity in the historical record. The trial court's approach 
was forthright about the uncertainty of historical events. Under the 
trial court's method, there can be no right answer in the historical 
record as long as there are competing stories. This method validates 
each version of the story. Thus, the trial court's methodology rejects 
the notion that history is objective or monolithic. Moreover, the El-
liott court used an historical method that showed potential for vindi-
cating the claims of traditionally disenfranchised groups. The trial 
court focused on the details, was attuned to the lessons of history and 
its particularities, and refused to draw grand conclusions-asking 
only whether the details supported a claim of intent. 
93 The Government in at least one of these cases was unable to establish that aboriginal rights 
were extinguished until late in the day, due in large part to uncertainty as to whether white 
settlers had actually occupied the land in question. See San Idelfonso, 513 F.2d at 1388-90. 
94 Elliott, 616 A.2d at 214 (citing to the unpublished trial court opinion). 
95Id. at 217-18. 
96Id. at 218. 
97Id. 
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The two Vermont courts used dramatically different methods. The 
trial court performed a meticulous and careful review of the historical 
record and sought to craft a narrative from the competing versions of 
the story. The Vermont Supreme Court jettisoned both the meticu-
lous review of the record and the narrative format. The impact of this 
formulaic shift was profound, suggesting that environmental justice 
advocates must not only force courts to recognize history, but must 
also argue for a particular historical method. 
Below we outline one historical method we think environmental 
justice advocates will find promising. Drawing on the work of histo-
rians engaged in the debate over the use and portrayal of history in 
public matters, we argue that a pragmatic approach to history is 
responsive to the needs of historically oppressed communities as long 
as it addresses the question of justice. 
IV. HISTORICAL METHOD 
The Byda and Elliott cases suggest that in the fight for environ-
mental justice a community must make zoning boards and courts 
approach history deliberately and carefully.98 Where Byda illustrates 
that communities must force decisionmakers to reckon with history, 
the Elliott case suggests that mere recognition of history's complexity 
is not enough. These cases suggest that communities fighting for 
environmental justice must also articulate and advance a particular 
approach to history. 
James Kloppenberg's recent discussion of legal history posits spe-
cific recommendations as to how history should be approached by 
lawyers and historians alike.99 Kloppenberg confronts the question 
Chemerinsky wrestled with: in light of the virtually universal con-
demnation of the notion that history might itself serve as a kind of 
Archimedean point, as a species of Truth, is there room for history in 
law? 
As Kloppenberg explains, the dominant critique of legal history has 
focused on the separation between the abstract and the concrete in 
legal historical studies. He argues that any conceptual scheme for 
developments in history and law is apt to ignore, or miss entirely, 
concrete developments in the lawYXJ Kloppenberg explains that there 
are currently two dominant approaches to history. On the one hand, 
there are the "deconstructionist historians" who are "attentive to the 
98 See supra notes 41-65, 90--97 and accompanying text. 
99 See Kloppenberg, supra note 23, at 1333-44. 
100 See id. at 1332-33. 
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slipperiness of meanings in language."lOl These historians argue that 
when historical evidence is presented as unambiguous, its many mean-
ings are buried beneath an artificially seamless interpretation.102 Yet, 
Kloppenberg notes, "once one becomes committed to destabilizing 
meanings, it can be difficult to know where to stop."103 In other words, 
he suggests, these historians are left to claim that historical evidence 
is indeterminate. In turn, they are rendered unable to make any 
reliable claims about either law or history. 
On the other hand, as Kloppenberg describes, there are historians 
who seek to reconstruct historical contexts notwithstanding the inde-
terminacy of meaning of historical evidence. These scholars-the "re-
constructionist historians" -look to the world from which texts and 
their authors emerge and "attempt to trace the meanings intended by 
authors, and understood by contemporary readers, through careful 
analysis of what was thinkable-and expressible-at the time a text 
was produced."104 The problem here, Kloppenberg asserts, is that the 
reconstructionists ignore the indeterminacy critique-the compelling 
argument that anyone text may have many different meanings-and 
thus they still hold that a true picture of the world can in fact be 
constructed, or reconstructed. 
Between the deconstructionists and the reconstructionists are those 
committed to "pragmatic hermeneutics." According to Kloppenberg, 
pragmatic hermeneutics denotes a method of continuous investigation 
of the meaning of texts. In turn, this method is to be pursued by an 
"open and ever-expanding community of inquiry," to ensure that as 
many points of view as possible are involved in the interpretation of 
historical data.105 As Kloppenberg describes, under a pragmatic her-
meneutic approach the social and economic context of an idea is seen 
as central to the idea itself. Any document or form of expression must 
101 [d. at 1334. 
10'2 See id. at 1334. Specifically, Kloppenberg writes that "when complex texts are used as 
pieces of purportedly unambiguous evidence, marshalled for straightforward contextual argu-
ments, their multifaceted meanings are submerged beneath a smooth-and therefore mislead-
ing-surface constructed by historians oblivious to the instability of ail linguistic signification." 
[d. at 1334. 
103 [d. 
WI [d. at 1335. 
105 [d. at 1336. Specifically, Kloppenberg describes "a method of continuous investigation and 
interpretation, pursued by an open and ever-expanding cammunity of inquiry, of the relations 
of meaning within and among texts, and as a process of interaction between critics and texts, 
between past and present." [d. (emphasis added). David Hollinger also describes a pragmatic 
approach to history as inclusive and pluralistic. He explains, for example, that the consensus-
based theory that truth pragmatism espouses "is more defensible if the group of inquirers is 
genuinely open to women and minorities." Hollinger, supra note 42, at 16. 
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be carefully examined, such that the connections between parts and 
wholes-between each word, text and author and its historical con-
text-are explored and re-exploredYl6 Moreover, Kloppenberg ex-
plains that texts must be interpreted with sensitivity to the uncer-
tainty of their meaning and to the "contested significance for us in 
the present."107 Reviewing Morton Horwitz's The Transformation of 
American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy, Kloppen-
berg suggests that Horwitz has adopted something akin to pragmatic 
hermeneutics. Citing Horwitz's injunction to defy the impulse to "hide 
behind unhistorical and abstract universalisms," Kloppenberg explains 
that for Horwitz, pragmatism provides the necessary alternative to 
the status quo because it embraces the notion that principles may 
change over time, and because it appreciates the complex relationship 
between law and politics and theory and practiceyJ8 Pragmatic her-
meneutics thus represents a way for courts and other decision-making 
bodies to engage the complexity and density of history. Akin to strict 
scrutiny in constitutional jurisprudence, pragmatic hermeneutics re-
quires a painstaking, critical and deliberative study of the historical 
record. It demands the instantiation of abstract notions such as due 
process, appropriateness and extinguishment by examining socioeco-
nomic contexts. As a result, it forces decisionmakers to confront the 
consequences of their decisions.109 Moreover, evoking Ronald Dworkin's 
idea of judicial integrity, which holds that judges must respect legal 
precedent while conforming to the immanent political principles of our 
liberal democracy, pragmatic hermeneutics involves consideration of 
and sensitivity of the past as well as the present. That is, judges and 
others must undertake a serious examination of history, whether 
embodied in precedent or some other extant record, and a sober 
consideration of the here and now, of contemporary society's evolving 
norms yo 
The historian Thomas Bender also argues for a better, fuller way 
of doing history, one that engages "[p]olitics, power, [and] public life 
106 Kloppenberg, supra note 23, at 1337. He writes that "the separation of abstract ideas from 
socioeconomic context ... when one employs the method of pragmatic hermeneutics." [d. 
107 [d. 
I 
108 [d. at 1350-51. Kloppenberg quotes Horwitz's closing remarks: "[O]nly pragmatism, with 
its dynamic understanding of the unfolding of principle over time and its experimental appre-
ciation of the complex interrelationship between law and politics and theory and practice, has 
stood against the static fundamentalism of traditional American conceptions of principled juris-
prudence." [d. 
109 See generally JOHN A. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); G. STONE, ET AL., CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 565-757 (1991). 
no RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 400-13 (1986). 
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•••• "111 Decrying the fragmentation of the historical profession into 
those scholars concerned with public history and those concerned 
with the histories of various subordinate groups, Bender calls for a 
new, synthetic history. He explains that historians of "women, blacks, 
immigrants, and others excluded from significant involvement in the 
public realm" view traditional public histories as "morally obtuse."112 
He adds that public history has in the past "devalued the lives of such 
groupS."113 Bender therefore argues that the relationship between 
different groups in society-the exclusion and subordination of one 
group by another-ought to be a part of any responsible "public" 
history. Only when the issues of exclusion and subordination become 
a part of public history, he suggests, can we begin to address ade-
quately the question of justice. According to Bender, such an approach 
to history will invariably provoke the sorts of questions that challenge 
the status quo and lead to social changeY4 
Bender does not stop there. He explains that the "problem" of 
public culture is that it reduces to what Heidegger called the "public 
interpretation of reality" -a struggle involving the possession of mean-
ing and the formal instruments of powerY5 Thus, Bender claims, the 
desire of powerful, dominant social groups to make their interpreta-
tion of the world universal is the central problem in the study of public 
culture. Analyzing, interpreting and understanding public culture is 
made difficult because those in power inevitably obscure or obliterate 
other voices. Thus, historians must not accept public culture as it is 
initially revealed. Rather, Bender argues, historians must investigate 
that culture, examine how it was made, and seek to understand the 
terms of participation of various groups in that culture. Such an 
investigation would thus not assume that all groups are represented 
in public and would seek to understand why some groups are more 
represented than others.u6 
1i1 Thomas Bender, Wholes and Parts: The Need for Synthesis in American History, 73 J. 
AM. RIST. 120, 125 (1986). 
112Id. at 131. 
113Id. 
114Id. at 132. Bender proposes "to establish the relations of various self-defined, externally 
defined, and structurally defined parts to each other and to the public culture that is constituted 
from their relations. Only then, when exclusion and subordination are established as relations 
in public, can meaning, significance, causation, and the question of justice be adequately 
addressed. Such a history will be more likely to provoke the corrosive sort of questions always 
associated with historical moments ready for social change." ld. (emphasis added). 
115 I d. at 135. 
116Id. As Bender puts it, 
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Bender therefore describes a new kind of history sensitive to the 
exclusion and subordination of certain groups in American history. In 
an effort to preserve the discipline of public history as a project for 
historians, Bender calls for responsibility and sensitivity. 
In both Elliott and Byda, history is cast in abstract terms, rather 
than as a function of specific events; as soon as history is decoupled 
from the particulars and nuances and from narrative, courts or zoning 
boards are essentially free to choose the level of abstraction from 
which to approach history. History is still conceived of as "true," but 
the specific historical truth ultimately flows from a deeply subjective 
decision on the part of the judges or board regarding the level of 
abstraction engaged. The Elliott court's decision to weigh the sover-
eign's intent against the Abenaki's turned the tide; the presentist lens 
of the dominant culture used by the court focused on one intent while 
blurring the other. Similarly, the Board's decision in Byda to charac-
terize the history of the area as primarily industrial while disregard-
ing the condition of the neighborhood as it presently existed makes 
its findings appear inexorable. Each view of history, then, stemmed 
not from objectivity but from arbitrariness. 
In the fight for environmental justice, it is not enough to argue that 
courts or zoning boards ought to engage history, for historical method 
itself has dramatic consequences on the quality of a particular deci-
sion. A community must also be prepared to argue that decisionmak-
ers must perform a pragmatic historical analysis, free of abstractions 
and sensitive to the questions of justice and aspiration. 
Borrowing from the ideas of Karp, Chemerinsky, Kloppenberg and 
Bender, a better method of doing history in environmental justice 
cases, and any cases involving issues of social justice, is available. This 
method entails two central features. First, courts and public officials 
must recognize that they are in fact doing history, that they are 
examining past events and practices and evaluating them in the light 
of some set of flexible criteria, such as a zoning board's use of the 
[p]articular social groups seeking power and recognition want to make their interpre-
tation of the world the universal one. The thrust by the powerful to define for them-
selves and for others a public culture that looks very much like their group values writ 
large presents the interpretive, analytical, and moral problem of the study of public 
culture. Histarians cannot take the public world on its own terms. It must be 
interrogated; we must inquire into its making, seeking to establish the various 
degrees and terms o/participation o/various groups in the public world . ... Such 
a histary would not assume that all relevant groups are represented in public. It 
would be concerned to know why some groups and some values are so much-or 
so little-represented in the public realm. 
Id. (quoting K. Mannheim) (emphasis added). 
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"appropriateness" standard. Second, having recognized that they are 
in fact conducting an historical investigation, courts and public officials 
must approach history pragmatically and with an eye toward justice. 
That is, they must interpret the historical record painstakingly and 
critically, with an understanding that their interpretation is necessar-
ily provisional. They then must interrogate the past, "inquir[ing] into 
its making, seeking to establish the various degrees and terms of 
participation of various groups .... "117 In this way, courts and public 
bodies will be forced to confront not only the complexities of history 
but also the matter of justice in history. 
V. CONCLUSION 
These cases from the front lines of the battle for environmental 
justice illustrate the dangers of history in the hands of zoning boards 
and courts. Recalling Karp's critique, these cases demonstrate pow-
erfully how history can be used to cloak power and oppression in the 
garb of objectivity or abstraction. 
Further, they suggest warnings for how history ought to be ap-
proached in city hall and the courtroom, and highlight the need for 
practitioners to be aware of the uses, and misuses, of history so that 
cases may be fought on the surest ground. A discussion of historical 
methods is not, at first blush, directly relevant to the work of envi-
ronmental justice advocates and community organizers. Yet, compla-
cency and the perverse use, or nonuse, of history in the two cases 
discussed in this Essay, and Chemerinsky's recent critique of the 
Supreme Court's methodology, raise the important question of the 
proper role of history in law generally and in environmental justice 
cases in particular. 
Byda and Elliott demonstrate that history must be addressed by 
communities that face environmental justice issues. As Byda sug-
gests, uncritical assessments of the history of an area or community, 
or the very history itself, may be hidden in the discrete criteria used 
by governmental bodies to chart the future of an area or neighbor-
hood. Equally unsettling, as the Elliott case shows, is the notion that 
the historical treatment of a group may well be the pivotal issue in 
determining present and future distribution of environmental bur-
117 Id. at 135. This kind of critical pragmatic approach, sensitive to cultural pluralism and the 
question of justice, is similar to the one Joseph Singer calls for in First Amendment jurispru-
dence. See Joseph W. Singer, Praperly and Coercion in Federal Indian Law: The Conflict 
Between Critical and Camplacent Pragmati8m, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1821, 1828-29 (1990). 
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dens and benefits. These cases reveal that traditionally oppressed 
communities must begin the fight for environmental justice by scru-
pulously examining the traps set by the uncritical notion of history as 
monolithic. 
In addition, environmental justice advocates and activists must be 
prepared to articulate the limits of historical analyses and to convinc-
ingly recast history where it is part and parcel of the decision-making 
process. Recognition of the role of history as urged by Karp and the 
promise of an enriched historical method set forth by Kloppenberg 
and Bender could help inform the strategy in a case such as Byda. An 
understanding of the role of history in environmental justice cases 
allows the community to uncover, for instance, the pitfalls inherent in 
the key statutory term "appropriate." Use of Kloppenberg's prag-
matic hermeneutic method and of Bender's synthetic approach might 
well facilitate the rich reconstruction of that key term, and thus reveal 
arguments that ought to be made as to its meaning. 
Moreover, pragmatic hermeneutics and synthesis would enable plain-
tiffs to marshal nuanced historical arguments to neutralize the seem-
ingly inexorable weight of the monolithic conception of history routinely 
presented by courts and zoning boards. Thus, at every opportunity, 
plaintiffs ought to articulate vigorously their own version of an area's 
past so that the final decision does not turn solely on the court's or zoning 
board's complacent interpretation. Moreover, plaintiffs from tradition-
ally disfranchised communities should explain that history itself has 
been largely unkind to them and thus should not be used to perpetuate 
past inequities. 
At the same time, in cases such as Elliott, an affirmative exposition 
of the limits of historical investigation by the Vermont Supreme Court 
would at least have shown that its rejection of the trial court's decision 
represented not a disagreement over doctrinal categories, but a fun-
damental disagreement over notions of history and historical method-
ology. An explicit disavowal by the court of the trial court's historical 
method might have at least forced the court to articulate its rejection 
of the notion that history is artifactual and particularistic. Forced to 
justify its methodology, the court may have been less willing to de-
scribe history in abstract terms and thus to ignore the contested 
factual record. 
Discussion of methodology and recognition of the support among 
professional historians for the kind of careful work the trial court 
undertook would have compelled the court to confront the merits of 
its own historical analysis. That is, acknowledging the prevailing view 
among historians, that history can never be cast in simple, monolithic 
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terms,118 would have forced the court into the uncomfortable position 
of having to reject the view of real historians in order to maintain that 
its decision turned on the "true" interpretation of competing histories. 
Perhaps, too, traditionally oppressed communities such as those in 
Byda and Elliott should urge courts and zoning boards to embrace a 
conception of history that incorporates not only the dense and difficult 
past but the promising future. That is, in aclmowledging that history 
will only take us so far in making decisions about today, courts, zoning 
boards and others should attempt to merge past and present in arriv-
ing at a history in a particular case. They should realize that the 
history of oppressed groups, of disfranchised communities, presents 
a largely negative lesson: a lesson that teaches what not to do but 
leaves unanswered the question of what to do today. That is why 
decisionmakers need to take into 'account the present aspirations of 
these communities when considering history-so that they may ob-
tain guidance when the historical record is at best contested and at 
worst morally bankrupt.ll9 By asking decisionmakers to consider the 
question of justice when they undertake a rigorous historical analysis, 
disempowered communities can begin to move away from that history 
and toward a better future. The argument for a better, richer history 
will thus mean that past injustices cannot be used to perpetuate social 
and environmental inequity. Decisionmakers will be required to ask 
not just where a community has been, but where it is now, where it 
wants to go, and where it should go as a matter of justice. 
118 See Hollinger, supra note 42, at 16. 
119 For an argument that resonates with our own regarding the inadequacy of history as a 
guide for present-day decisions, see James Atlas, Yesterday's Gane; History's Use As a Guide-
book is Overrated, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,1994, § 4 (The Week In Review) at 1, 4: 
Id. 
By citing precedents, comparing one thing to another, we tame our fear of the un-
known, establish a reassuring sense that every new experience has a name .... The 
trouble is that history ... resists analogy .... The study of history deepens our sense 
of what it means to be human-but it doesn't make us prophets. 
